[.uk] The Austro-Prussian War: Austria's War with Prussia and ... (ISBN 0521560594)

Book Description:
This is a new history of the Austro-Prussian-Italian War of 1866, which paved the way for German and Italian unification. Geoffrey Wawro describes Prussia's successful invasion of Habsburg Bohemia, and the wretched collapse of the Austrian army in July 1866. Blending military and social history, he describes the panic that overtook Austria's regiments in each clash with the Prussians. He reveals the blundering of the Austrian commandant who fumbled away key strategic advantages and ultimately lost a war --crucial to the fortunes of the Habsburg Monarchy-- that most European pundits had predicted they would win.

Illegible:
I have no wish to criticise the writer- I moved on to this book after being very impressed by his work on the Franco-Prussian War, but I bought the paperback over the Internet and was shocked when it arrived- the print is very small and I had to struggle to read it with a magnifying glass. Cambridge should be ashamed of producing such a volume.

view from Czech Republic:
Having studied in Koniggratz (now Hradec Kralove in Czech Republic) for six years, the Austro Prussian war of 1866 has become my hobby. For a long time the work of Cordon Graig (Battle of Koniggratz) was the fundamental work, being now replaced by the book of Geoffrey Wawro, which I find great, pushing the topic one generation further. This work deserves praise, especially for its highly analytical perception of the campaign as a whole and clear and concise description of major battles. I would however point out some details with which I disagree, the interest might be in the fact that their are seen from local (i.e. Czech ) perspective. 1) The author uses German names for the sites, what is missing is the current Czech version of the names of these places. This makes it difficult to trace the battle in contemporary maps (after the unjust expulsion of 3 millions of Germans after WWII all towns and villages in Bohemia and Moravia are named in Czech only). Even here the author is not consequential enough and sometimes strangely uses Czech names instead of German ones (Jicin - Gitschin, Skalice - Skalitz,...). 2) The poisoning of wells mentioned in the text is very strange, I firmly believe that in that time (1866)this way of passive defence was not used. It was never very favorite in this part of Europe anyway. 3) The repeated allusions to the "good soldier Svejk" are completely misplaced in the context of this book. Svejk is a very popular book in our country, but it refers to another war and another situation. Typically enough, no Czech book about the subject of war of 1866 mentiones good soldier Svejk, as it is completely out of context. The author evidently wanted to give to his narrative some local flavour, unfortunately this one does not work too much. 4) The maps could have been less crude, but to give justice, without being too artistic, they manage to give the right perception about the development of the situation. I think however that a room for improvement in next edition is definitely here. Summary : I highly recommend the Geoffrey Wawro book to anybody interested in this campaign, which (although a bit forgotten by now) played a crucial role in European history.

Well-written military history:
Sadly, there is a definite paucity of the published sources that deals with the Austro-Prussian war. Therefore, Prof. Wawro's The Austro-Prussian war is welcome edition .Even more this work is one of well-written military history that succeeds to balance out between readibility and informativeness. I especially like the layout and structure of the book.First three chapters the author covers strategies, tactics of both Austrian and Prussian army, mobilization as well as the origination of war in 1866.Only contents of these three chapters are worth the price( if a bit of hyperboly) The author conveys detailed informations on the origin of Austrian's "Storm" tactic and rationale behind it, Prussia's adoption of tactic based on the so-called Dreyse niddle rifle and how effectively it fended off Danish Storm colums in Danish war. I think these three chapters are as important as subsequent chapters that actually cover the battle. Providing enough detailed information on participants of the war , the author can focus on the each battle without digressing from the narration that often divert readers' attention. After introductory chapters , the author plunges into the battle between Archduke Albrecht's Austrian South army and Italian army. Author's tone on the execution of the battle is highly critical on both sides. Although author seems to give the credit to Albrecht and his COS John , he criticizes their timid approach that stole Austria the opportunity to rout ill-led , ill-fed and ill-motivated Italian army. I personally think chapters that covers battle between Austria and Italy are most compelling in the entire book. The author does not take usual the victor's perspective but the vanquished , therefore retrospectively examined cause of the defeat.He used many archive sources that has not been used by many historians. The battle known as "the battle of Koniggratz " are mericulously covered along the 5 chapters. Narration is often exciting and readable enough that I finished reading them very quickly. However there are several points that I think the author should have elucidate more. At first , Austro-Prussian war included numerous different participants apart from Prussia, Austria, her German Allies and Italy(e.g other Prussia's German allies are not even mentioned).Although many of them are nothing other than the client pricipalities of Prussia, there must have been diplomatically and militarily interesting facts that could be compared to Austria and Austria's German allies. Secondly, the author tend to give too much weight on the role of each belligenlant's C-and-Cs (Moltke and Benedek). Especially, when the author states the Prussian field commanders. The author tend to categorically portrays them as imcompentent , insubordinated,old-fashioned bunch.Then, Why all senior commanders, except for aging Herwert von Bittenfeld, hold positions in Fraco-Prussian war? While von Bonin never reemployeed. In addition to that author assumes that the main cause of Austrian defeat was imcompetant generalship and inappropriate and often incomprehensible reaction of Benedek. There would not be any objection that Benedek's conduct during the battle is generally very passive and dismal . However, we could not ignored the fact that Benedek rejected the offer to be the commander of Northern Army three times based on that he did not know anything about Prussians and terrain he was supposed to fight. It was the Franz Josheph's blunder that made him the commander of North army that supposed commander conceded his ignorance and lack of chance to win. Through out entire battle, Benedek was strangely inactive and even timid. Why did he act so unlikely to his reputation and kept insisting to move to Jisin ? Later, at the battle of koeniggratz , the author assumes if Benedeck had ordered to attack disjointed Prussian line , the outcome of the battle would have been different. However, I personally don't agree with that for Mollinary's troops that pushed Prussians recorded enormous loss and mis-caliberated Concourdat's and Ramming's attack column totally melt away by disciplined Prussian rifle fire. I assumes that true cause of Austria's defeat is lack of professionalism combined with lack of discipline among rank and files; good example would be marching discipline and retreat that always ended up being panic striken rout. The authour often mentioned the fatigue of Austrian units after march and how it affected their performance in battle;it shows the difference of discipline and degree of training between both armies.Especially conduct during the forced march is a mearsure of how well trained the infantry units are. The last chapter that covers aftermath of the battle, the author gives his view on so-called battle of annihilation of Moltke was misused and in the end brought the end of Germany hegemony in Europe. That is short but very enlightening part. The only complaint of mine is the absent of OB and more detailed map , which is provided in same author's book "Fraco-Prussian war". Anyhow, the book is truly well written.highly recommended.

A gem:
Taking a little-known topic like the Austro-Prussian (and Italian) War could have been just a futile academic exercise. Wawro turns this little book into a real treasure. Within just the first few pages he does a succinct and brilliant job of analyzing Clausewitz and Jomini and explaining the rise of Prussia to dominate Germany and Europe. The cover art doesn't do the book justice, but I'll be looking forward to Wawro's future work.

4 to 1 ratio of firepower; 4 to 1 ratio of casualties!:
This is an outstanding book that is very well written. Although definitely Austro-Centric, it has superb use of sources and secondary works. Why the Austrians lost the war was due to many factors; not the least of which was firepower. The needle gun could deliver four times as many shots per minute as the Rifled muskets that the Austrians used. This was perhaps the deciding factor, as reflected in the casualty ratio of four to one in favor of the Prussians in every battle! Although the Austrians had superior artillery, they could not quite use it decisively; perhaps because of their over-reliance on a combination of "strategic defense, tactical offense". The book has a vast number of examples of Austrian shortcomings; a better Austrian general or one of at least average competency would have made far better use of their "central position" when the clunky Prussian War Machine gave them openings. The pathetic non-use of cavalry by both sides is surprising, considering how the role of cavalry had changed during the American Civil War. Each side should have made use of deep cavalry raids to attack their opponents lines of communication. Think of what a competent Austrian general could have done with their superb cavalry if it had been properly employed in raids against the Prussian communications as they withdrew along their own railroads! The only negative in this book is that the maps lack a kilometer scale, which prevents the reader from considering the distances of marches and the size of the battlefield.